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We ran a ransomware tabletop and learned that our Veeam repository is immutable but the backup console, identity provider and DNS all depend on the same environment we would be recovering. The data is safe, but the team could not start a clean restore without production credentials. How are people designing around this?
That is the difference between having backups and having a recovery system. Keep break glass credentials offline, document how to reach the backup platform without normal SSO, and make sure the recovery network does not depend on production DNS. Then test it with the normal admins locked out.
Add a clean room plan too. Restoring straight back into the compromised network can reintroduce the attacker. You need known good admin workstations, separate scanning and a decision about which systems come back first. Immutable only protects the copies from being changed.
edit: we had a runbook, but it assumed the domain controllers were available. That was an embarrassing five minutes. Do you keep a physical copy of credentials, or is a separate cloud vault enough?
We keep two methods because the disaster you plan for is never the one you get. Sealed physical material in two locations, plus a vault in a separate identity boundary. Both are tested quarterly. The test includes a real restore and application validation, not just seeing a green backup job.